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(army_1.txt) Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board
[October 20, 1944].
From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 221-30.
(army_2.txt) Memorandum for the Secretary of War [from the Judge
Advocate General, November 25, 1944].
From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 231-69.
(ballant1.txt) Memorandum of a Conversation
[A Review of Various Disagreements].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 764-66.
(ballant2.txt) Memorandum of a Conversation [The Secretary of State
with Nomura and Kurusu], December 7, 1941.
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 786-87.
(fdr_1.txt) Excerpt from Radio Bulletin No. 176, Issued by the
White House on July 25, 1941 [Observations Concerning
Trade with Japan].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp.
(fdr_2.txt) Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese
Ambassador (Nomura) on August 17, 1941 [Basis for Renewed
Discussions].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 557-59.
(fdr_3.txt) Oral Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the
Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on September 3, 1941
[Request for Clarification on Basic Issues].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 589-91.
(fdr_4.txt) Communication from President Roosevelt, Given by Sumner
Welles, Under Secretary of State to Ambassadors Nomura and
Kurusu, December 2, 1941 [Japanese Troop Movements to Southern
Indochina]. From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, p. 779.
(fdr_5.txt) President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito of Japan.
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 784-86.
(grew_1.txt) The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Rumor of Air Strike on Pearl Harbor].
From Japan 1931-1941, Vol. 11, p. 133.
(grew_2.txt) The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Japanese Foreign Minister's Criticism of U.S. Foreign Policy]
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 145-48.
(grew_3.txt) The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Japanese Foreign Minister's Criticism of U.S. Foreign
Policy].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 145-48.
(grew_4.txt) The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Premier Tojo's Speech], December 1, 1941.
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 148-49.
(hirohit1.txt) Imperial Rescript of December 8, 1941.
[Declaration of war on United States and Great Britain.]
(hull_1.txt) Draft Proposal Handed by the Secretary of State to the
Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on June 21, 1941
[Proposed Compromise].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp.
(hull_2.txt) Memorandum by the Secretary of State
[Conversation of President Roosevelt with Nomura and Kurusu].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 740-43.
(hull_3.txt) Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Conversation of the
President with Nomura and Kurusu].
From Japan 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 770-72.
(jones_1.txt) The Secretary of Commerce (Jones) to the Secretary of State
[Petroleum Products Shipped to Japan].
From Foreign Relations, 1941, Vol. IV, pp. 814-15.
(navy_1.txt) Report of Navy Court of Inquiry [October 19, 1944].
From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 297-322.
(navy_2.txt) Addendum to [Navy] Court's Finding of Facts
[October 19, 1994].
From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 323-30.
(navy_3.txt) Fourth Endorsement [by the Secretary of the Navy] to
Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry
and Fourth Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report to the
Secretary of the Navy Dated 12 July 1945 [August 1945].
From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 355-70.
(nomura1.txt) Statement by the Japanese Government Handed by the
Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to President Roosevelt on
August 28, 1941 [Proposal for Summit Conference].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 573-75.
(nomura2.txt) Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)
to the Secretary of State on September 6 1941
[Proposed Compromise].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 608-9.
(nomura3.txt) Document Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the
Secretary of State on November 7, 1941
[Japanese Troops in China and Indochina].
From Japan, 1931-1941 Vol. II, pp. 709-10.
(nomura4.txt) Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)
to the Secretary of State on November 20 1941
[Proposed Compromise].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 755-56.
(nomura5.txt) Memorandum Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the
Secretary of State at 2:20 P.M. on December 7, 1941 [The
"Fourteen Part" Message].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 787-92.
(outerbr1.txt) Submarine contacts outside Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941
[Testimony of Capt. Outerbridge, USS WARD, before the
Hewitt Inquiry.]
(radiolog.zip) Facsimile of Bishop's Point Radio Station log of report
from USS WARD regarding submarine detected in approaches
to Pearl Harbor.
(roberts.txt) Report of Roberts Commission [January 23, 1942]
From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 1-21.
(sos_1.txt) Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the
Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on October 2, 1941
[Answer to Japanese Proposal].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 656-61.
(sos_2.txt) Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the
Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 15, 1941
[Proposal Concerning Economic Policy].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 734-37.
(sos_3.txt) Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the
Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 26, 1941
[Proposal for "a broad but Simple Settlement"].
From Japan 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 766-67.
(sos_4.txt) Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese
Ambassador (Nomura) on November 26, 1941
[Proposed Compromise].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 768-70.
(terasak1.txt) Statement Handed by the First Secretary of the Japanese
Embassy (Terasaki) to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine on December 2,
1941 [Observations on Premier Tojo's Speech].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, p. 778.
(turner_1.txt) The Director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department
(Turner) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Stark),
July 19, 1941 [The Possible Effects of an Embargo].
From Foreign Relations, 1941, Vol. IV, pp. 839-40.
(tyler_1.txt) Testimony of Lt. K. Tyler regarding receipt of report
from Opana Pt. radar station.
From Navy Board of Inquiry.
(wallace1.txt) Vice President Wallace to the Secretary of State
[Exports to Japan].
From Foreign Relations, 1941, Vol. IV, pp. 815-16.
(welles_1.txt) Press Release Issued by the Department of State on
July 24, 1941
[Japan and French Indochina].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 315-17.
(welles_2.txt) Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State
[The President's Conversation with Nomura].
From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, PP. 527-30.
Congressional investigation
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
REPORT
OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress
A concurrent resolution to investigate the attack on Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and
circumstances relating thereto.
C O N T E N T S
................................................................... Page
Foreword ........................................................... xi
Introductory statement ............................................ xiii
Part I. Diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack .......... 1
Japanese record of deceit and aggression ........................ 1
Fundamental differences between American and Japanese policies .. 4
Steps taken by the United States to meet the threat of Axis
aggression...................................................... 10
Initial United States-Japanese negotiations: 1941 ................ 13
Japanese proposal of May 12 ...................................... 14
Japanese reaction to German invasion of Russia ................... 15
Temporary cessation of negotiations .............................. 16
Freezing of assets ............................................... 18
Resumption of negotiations and proposed meeting of President
Roosevelt and Premier Konoye ................................... 19
Japanese proposals of September 6 and 27 ......................... 26
Advent of the Tojo Cabinet ....................................... 28
Arrival of Saburo Kurusu ......................................... 30
Negotiations versus deadlines .................................... 32
Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and the modus vivendi .......... 32
United States memorandum of November 26 .......................... 38
Fraudulent nature of Japanese diplomacy November 28 to
December 7 ..................................................... 42
Diplomatic and military liaison in Washington .................... 43
Conclusions ...................................................... 47
Part II. The Japanese attack and its aftermath ..................... 53
Formulation of the plan and date for execution ................... 53
Nature of the plan ............................................... 54
Departure for the attack ......................................... 56
Execution of the attack .......................................... 57
Air phase ..................................................... 57
Submarine phase ............................................... 62
Withdrawal of the striking force ................................. 63
Damage to United States naval forces and installations as a result
of the attack .................................................. 64
Damage to United States Army forces and installations as a result
of the attack .................................................. 65
Japanese losses .................................................. 65
Summary comparison of losses ..................................... 65
State of readiness to meet the attack ............................ 66
Attack a surprise .............................................. 66
Personnel ...................................................... 66
Antiaircraft ................................................... 67
Aircraft ....................................................... 68
Action taken following the attack ................................ 68
Defensive forces and facilities of the Navy at Hawaii ............ 69
Defensive forces and facilities of the Army at Hawaii ............ 70
Comparison of strength and losses: Japanese attacking force and
Hawaiian defensive forces ...................................... 70
Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii ............................... 75
Consciousness of danger from air attack .......................... 75
Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack ........... 75
General Short's awareness of danger from air attack ............ 79
Plans for the defense of Hawaiian coastal frontier ............. 81
Concept of the war in the Pacific .............................. 87
Conclusions with respect to consciousness of danger from air
attack ....................................................... 88
Information supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington indicating the
imminence of war .............................................. 89
Information supplied General Short by Washington indicating the
imminence of war .............................................. 100
Action taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to warnings and orders
from Washington ............................................... 103
Dispatch of October 16 from-Chief of Naval Operations ....... 103
Dispatch of November 24 from Chief of Naval Operations ...... 104
The "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ................... 104
Evaluation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ......... 107
On where the attack might come .............................. 107
Other dispatches received on November 27 .................... 108
"Psychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral Kimmel ....... 109
The "War warning" and training .............................. 110
The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to institute
distant reconnaissance .................................... 110
Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning" .... 117
Estimate and action taken by General Short with respect to the
warning dispatch of November 27 ............................... 119
No warning of attack on Hawaii .............................. 120
Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage .................... 121
"Do-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and
"Avoidance of war" ........................................ 123
Commanding general's reliance on the Navy .................... 125
Interference with training ................................... 125
The order to undertake reconnaissance ........................... 126
The Short reply ................................................. 128
Action which was not taken upon receipt of the November 27
dispatch ...................................................... 129
The "Code destruction" intelligence ............................. 130
General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter
by Japanese consulate ......................................... 131
The "Lost" Japanese carriers Radio intelligence at Hawaii ....... 133
The "Mori" call ................................................. 137
Detection of Japanese submarine on morning of December 7 ........ 138
Radar detection of Japanese raiding force ....................... 140
Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in Hawaii .......... 142
Channels of intelligence ..................................... 142
The "Manila message" ......................................... 142
The Honolulu press ........................................... 142
The role of espionage in the attack ............................. 145
Liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short ................ 150
Estimate of the situation ....................................... 153
Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington ........................... 159
Basing the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii .............................. 159
Defensive facilities available in Hawaii ........................ 163
Transfer of Pacific Fleet units to the Atlantic ................. 167
"ABCD" understanding? ........................................... 168
Avoidance of war ................................................ 172
Intelligence available in Washington ............................ 179
The "Magic" .................................................. 179
Policy with respect to dissemination of magic ................ 180
"Ships in harbor" reports ....................................... 181
Nature of consular espionage ................................. 181
Conclusions with respect to "Ships in harbor" reports ........ 189
The "Winds code" ................................................ 191
"Hidden word" code .............................................. 192
The "Deadline messages" ......................................... 193
Dispatches indicating fraudulent nature of negotiations after
November 28, 1941 ............................................. 195
Status of diplomatic negotiations and the Army dispatch of
November 27 ................................................... 198
Failure to follow-up on the Short reply of November 28 .......... 201
The "Berlin message" ............................................ 204
Code destruction intelligence ................................... 205
The McCollum dispatch ........................................... 206
Events of December 6 and 7, 1941 ................................ 209
The "Pilot message" ........................................... 210
The fourteen part memorandum .................................. 211
First thirteen parts ........................................ 211
Analysis and significance of first thirteen parts proper .... 212
Military significance of "Pilot" and "13-part" messages
apart from messages proper ................................ 219
The fourteenth part ....................................... 221
"One o'clock" and final code destruction messages ............... 222
Events attending transmittal of the December 7 dispatch ...... 224
Choice of facilities ......................................... 225
Significance of the "One o'clock" and code destruction
messages ................................................... 226
Significant messages translated after the attack ................ 228
Intelligence concerning Hawaiian defenses ..................... 228
Considerations responsible for delays in translations ......... 230
Conclusions with respect to intelligence available in
Washington which was not supplied Hawaii ...................... 232
Estimate of the situation in Washington ......................... 234
Nature of responsibilities ...................................... 237
Duties in Hawaii ............................................. 237
Duties in Washington ......................................... 238
Unity of command ................................................ 240
General observations ............................................ 245
The "Wyman Matter" ........................................... 245
The Philippine Attack ........................................ 246
Prior inquiries concerning the Pearl Harbor attack ........... 246
Part V. Conclusions and recommendations ........................... 251
Conclusions with respect to responsibilities .................... 251
Recommendations ................................................. 252
Supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in
our military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl
Harbor investigation .......................................... 253
Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of
authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility ...... 254
Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for
granted in the alerting of subordinates ................... 254
Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information
should always be resolved in favor of supplying the
information ............................................... 255
The delegation of authority or the issuance of order's
entails the duty of inspection to determine that the
official mandate is properly exercised .................... 255
The implementation of official orders must be followed with
closest supervision ....................................... 256
The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be
insured through repetition ................................ 256
Complacency and procrastination are out of place where
sudden and decisive action are of the essence ............. 257
The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in
times of stress must be insured by continuity of service
and centralization of responsibility in competent
officials ................................................. 257
The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is
fatal: There should never be any hesitancy in asking for
clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on
matters that are in doubt ................................. 258
There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness
on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials ..... 259
Communications must be characterized by clarity,
forthrightness, and appropriateness ....................... 259
There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information
received and every effort should be made to insure that
the paraphrased material reflects the true meaning of the
original .................................................. 260
Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the
exigencies of unusual situations .......................... 261
Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum
number of officials, while often necessary, should not be
carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the
organization .............................................. 261
There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident .. 262
Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit
of significant information ................................ 262
An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail
with his organization should forfeit his responsibility ... 263
Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation
for any eventuality ....................................... 263
Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an
official instruction ...................................... 263
Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization ... 264
Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted
in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the latter
is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more
agencies .................................................. 264
No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure
to perform a fundamental task ............................. 265
Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates
adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should
keep their superiors informed ............................. 285
The administrative organization of any establishment must be
designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility .. 265
In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of
responsibility and authority .............................. 266
Committee members signing the report ............................ 266
Additional views of Mr. Keefe ................................... 266
Appendix A. Prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor
attack .......................................................... 269
The Roberts Commission .......................................... 269
The Hart Inquiry ................................................ 269
The Army Pearl Harbor Board ..................................... 269
The Navy Court of Inquiry ....................................... 270
The Clarke Inquiry .............................................. 270
The Clausen Investigation ....................................... 270
The Hewitt Inquiry .............................................. 271
Appendix B. Names and positions of principal Army and Navy
officials in Washington and at Hawaii at the time of the attack
along with the leading witnesses in the various proceedings ..... 275
Organization and personnel of War Department .................. 275
Army Air Forces ............................................. 275
Organization and personnel of Navy Department ................. 276
Organization and personnel of Hawaiian Department ............. 276
Hawaiian Air Force .......................................... 277
Staff of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and United
States Pacific Fleet ........................................ 277
Organization and personnel of Fourteenth Naval District .... 278
List of witnesses appearing before the Joint Committee and
their assignments as of December 7, 1941 .................... 278
List of leading witnesses in prior proceedings who did not
testify before the Joint Committee and their assignments as
of December 7, 1941 ......................................... 279
Appendix C. Communications from the President of the United States
relating to the Pearl Harbor investigation ...................... 285
Appendix D. Review of the diplomatic conversations between the
United States and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic
Conference in August 1941 through December 8, 1941 .............. 291
Introductory statement ........................................ 291
Brief resume of the Japanese-American conversations prior to
the Atlantic Conference ..................................... 293
The Atlantic Conference (August 10-14, 1941) .................. 300
President Roosevelt warns Japan against further aggression and
at the same time offers to resume the Japanese-American
conversations (August 17, 1941) ............................. 302
Japan protests United States shipments of oil to Russia
(August 27, 1941) ........................................... 305
Premier Konoye sends a personal message to President Roosevelt
urging the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August 28, 1941) .... 306
Germany suspects treachery (August 29-30, 1941) ................. 307
President Roosevelt replies to Premier Konoye's message
(September 3, 1941) ........................................... 310
Japan presents new proposals in a new form (September 6, 1941) .. 311
Ambassador Grew supports the proposed "Leaders Conference"
(August-September, 1941) ....................................... 314
Japan determines its minimum demands and its maximum concessions
in the negotiations with the United States
(September 6, 1941) ........................................... 316
The United States asks Japan to clarify its new proposals
(October 2, 1941) ............................................. 319
Germany demands that Japan warn the United States that war
between Germany and Italy and the United States would lead to
war between Japan and the United States pursuant to the
Tripartite Pact (October 1941) ................................ 325
The Konoye Cabinet falls, and Ambassador Nomura asks permission
to return to Japan (October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5,
1941) ......................................................... 326
The Tojo Cabinet formulates its "Absolutely final proposal"
(November 5, 1941) ............................................ 331
Ambassador Grew warns that war with Japan may come with
"Dramatic and dangerous suddenness" (November 3, 1941) ........ 335
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appeals to Great Britain and the
United States for aid (October 28-November 4, 1941) ........... 337
Japan delivers its next-to-last proposal to the United States
(November 10, 1941) ........................................... 344
The Tojo Cabinet refuses to consider any suggestion less
favorable to Japan than its" Absolutely final proposal"
(November 18-19, 1941) ........................................ 355
Japan delivers its "Absolutely final proposal" to the United
States and demands an agreement on that basis
(November 20, 1941) ........................................... 360
The United States replies (November 26, 1941) ................... 363
The Tojo Cabinet makes a pretense of continuing the Japanese-
American conversations and at the same time moves additional
Japanese troops into southern Indochina
(November 27-December 7, 1941) ................................ 387
The invasion of Thailand by Japanese forces from French Indochina
appears imminent (December 1-7, 1941) ......................... 405
Germany tells Japan the time is ripe to strike at the United
States, and promises to join with Japan in war against the
United States (November 29, 1941) ............................. 409
President Roosevelt returns to Washington as the far eastern
situation moves rapidly toward a climax (December 1, 1941) .... 411
President Roosevelt asks the Japanese Government to explain its
purpose in moving additional troops into southern Indochina
(December 2, 1941) ............................................. 415
The Japanese Government claims its troop movements in French
Indochina are for the purpose of defense against an attack by
the Chinese (December 5, 1941) ................................ 421
The last hours (December 6-8, 1941) ............................. 424
Appendix E. The "Winds Code" ...................................... 469
Establishment and nature of the "Winds Code" .................... 469
Efforts to monitor .............................................. 471
Considerations bearing on the possibility of a message in
execution of the "Winds Code" having been received prior to
December 7, 1941 .............................................. 471
Considerations militating against likelihood of "Winds Code"
execute message having been received prior to
December 7, 1941 .............................................. 475
Appendix F. Geographical considerations and Navy and Army
installations ................................................... 489
Geographical considerations ................................... 489
Navy and Army installations ................................... 490
Navy ........................................................ 490
Army ........................................................ 491
Illustrations ................................................. 499
Pearl Harbor Final Judgement by H.C.Clausen & Bruce Lee
The New Mysteries of Pearl Harbor by Francois Delpla
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