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Description of files
Congressional Investigation, table of contents



Description of files

Update to: Sun, 4 Feb 96
Reference site, providing a suggested research path:
http://sunsite.unc.edu/pha/pha/
(army_1.txt)    Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board  
                [October 20, 1944]. 
                From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 221-30. 
 
(army_2.txt)    Memorandum for the Secretary of War [from the Judge  
                Advocate General, November 25, 1944]. 
                From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 231-69. 
 
(ballant1.txt)  Memorandum of a Conversation  
                [A Review of Various Disagreements].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 764-66.  
 
(ballant2.txt)  Memorandum of a Conversation [The Secretary of State  
                with Nomura and Kurusu], December 7, 1941. 
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 786-87.  
 
(fdr_1.txt)     Excerpt from Radio Bulletin No. 176, Issued by the  
                White House on July 25, 1941 [Observations Concerning  
                Trade with Japan].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp.  
 
(fdr_2.txt)     Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese  
                Ambassador (Nomura) on August 17, 1941 [Basis for Renewed  
                Discussions]. 
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 557-59.  
 
(fdr_3.txt)     Oral Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the  
                Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on September 3, 1941  
                [Request for Clarification on Basic Issues].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 589-91.  
 
(fdr_4.txt)     Communication from President Roosevelt, Given by Sumner  
                Welles, Under Secretary of State to Ambassadors Nomura and  
                Kurusu, December 2, 1941 [Japanese Troop Movements to Southern  
                Indochina]. From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, p. 779.  
 
(fdr_5.txt)     President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito of Japan.  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 784-86.  
 
(grew_1.txt)    The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State  
                [Rumor of Air Strike on Pearl Harbor].  
                From Japan 1931-1941, Vol. 11, p. 133.  
 
(grew_2.txt)    The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State  
                [Japanese Foreign Minister's Criticism of U.S. Foreign Policy] 
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 145-48. 
 
 
(grew_3.txt)    The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State  
                [Japanese Foreign Minister's Criticism of U.S. Foreign  
                Policy]. 
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 145-48.  
 
(grew_4.txt)    The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State  
                [Premier Tojo's Speech], December 1, 1941.  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 148-49.  
 
(hirohit1.txt)  Imperial Rescript of December 8, 1941. 
                [Declaration of war on United States and Great Britain.] 
  
(hull_1.txt)    Draft Proposal Handed by the Secretary of State to the  
                Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on June 21, 1941  
                [Proposed Compromise].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp.   
  
(hull_2.txt)    Memorandum by the Secretary of State  
                [Conversation of President Roosevelt with Nomura and Kurusu].   
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 740-43.   
 
(hull_3.txt)    Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Conversation of the  
                President with Nomura and Kurusu]. 
                From Japan 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 770-72.  
 
(jones_1.txt)   The Secretary of Commerce (Jones) to the Secretary of State  
                [Petroleum Products Shipped to Japan].  
                From Foreign Relations, 1941, Vol. IV, pp. 814-15.  
 
(navy_1.txt)    Report of Navy Court of Inquiry [October 19, 1944]. 
                From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 297-322. 
 
(navy_2.txt)    Addendum to [Navy] Court's Finding of Facts  
                [October 19, 1994]. 
                From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 323-30. 
 
(navy_3.txt)    Fourth Endorsement [by the Secretary of the Navy] to  
                Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry  
                and Fourth Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report to the  
                Secretary of the Navy Dated 12 July 1945 [August 1945]. 
                From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 355-70. 
 
(nomura1.txt)   Statement by the Japanese Government Handed by the  
                Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to President Roosevelt on  
                August 28, 1941 [Proposal for Summit Conference].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 573-75.  
 
(nomura2.txt)   Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)  
                to the Secretary of State on September 6 1941  
                [Proposed Compromise].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 608-9.  
 
(nomura3.txt)   Document Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the  
                Secretary of State on November 7, 1941  
                [Japanese Troops in China and Indochina].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941 Vol. II, pp. 709-10.  
 
(nomura4.txt)   Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)  
                to the Secretary of State on November 20 1941  
                [Proposed Compromise].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 755-56. 
  
(nomura5.txt)   Memorandum Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the  
                Secretary of State at 2:20 P.M. on December 7, 1941 [The  
                "Fourteen Part" Message].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 787-92.  
 
(outerbr1.txt)  Submarine contacts outside Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941 
                [Testimony of Capt. Outerbridge, USS WARD, before the 
                Hewitt Inquiry.] 
 
(radiolog.zip)  Facsimile of Bishop's Point Radio Station log of report 
                from USS WARD regarding submarine detected in approaches 
                to Pearl Harbor. 
  
(roberts.txt)   Report of Roberts Commission [January 23, 1942] 
                From Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 1-21. 
 
(sos_1.txt)     Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the  
                Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on October 2, 1941  
                [Answer to Japanese Proposal].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 656-61.  
 
(sos_2.txt)     Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the  
                Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 15, 1941  
                [Proposal Concerning Economic Policy]. 
                From Japan,    1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 734-37.  
 
(sos_3.txt)     Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the  
                Japanese  Ambassador (Nomura) on November 26, 1941  
                [Proposal for "a broad but Simple Settlement"].  
                From Japan 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 766-67.   
                     
(sos_4.txt)     Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese  
                Ambassador (Nomura) on November 26, 1941  
                [Proposed Compromise].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 768-70. 
 
(terasak1.txt)  Statement Handed by the First Secretary of the Japanese  
                Embassy (Terasaki) to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine on December 2,  
                1941 [Observations on Premier Tojo's Speech].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, p. 778.  
 
(turner_1.txt)  The Director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department  
                (Turner) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Stark),  
                July 19, 1941 [The Possible Effects of an Embargo]. 
                From Foreign Relations, 1941, Vol. IV, pp. 839-40.  
 
(tyler_1.txt)   Testimony of Lt. K. Tyler regarding receipt of report 
                from Opana Pt. radar station. 
                From Navy Board of Inquiry. 
 
(wallace1.txt)  Vice President Wallace to the Secretary of State  
                [Exports to Japan].   
                From Foreign Relations, 1941, Vol. IV, pp. 815-16.   
 
(welles_1.txt)  Press Release Issued by the Department of State on  
                July 24, 1941  
                [Japan and French Indochina].  
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 315-17.  
 
(welles_2.txt)  Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State  
                [The President's Conversation with Nomura]. 
                From Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, PP. 527-30.


Congressional investigation

INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress A concurrent resolution to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto. C O N T E N T S ................................................................... Page Foreword ........................................................... xi Introductory statement ............................................ xiii Part I. Diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack .......... 1 Japanese record of deceit and aggression ........................ 1 Fundamental differences between American and Japanese policies .. 4 Steps taken by the United States to meet the threat of Axis aggression...................................................... 10 Initial United States-Japanese negotiations: 1941 ................ 13 Japanese proposal of May 12 ...................................... 14 Japanese reaction to German invasion of Russia ................... 15 Temporary cessation of negotiations .............................. 16 Freezing of assets ............................................... 18 Resumption of negotiations and proposed meeting of President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye ................................... 19 Japanese proposals of September 6 and 27 ......................... 26 Advent of the Tojo Cabinet ....................................... 28 Arrival of Saburo Kurusu ......................................... 30 Negotiations versus deadlines .................................... 32 Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and the modus vivendi .......... 32 United States memorandum of November 26 .......................... 38 Fraudulent nature of Japanese diplomacy November 28 to December 7 ..................................................... 42 Diplomatic and military liaison in Washington .................... 43 Conclusions ...................................................... 47 Part II. The Japanese attack and its aftermath ..................... 53 Formulation of the plan and date for execution ................... 53 Nature of the plan ............................................... 54 Departure for the attack ......................................... 56 Execution of the attack .......................................... 57 Air phase ..................................................... 57 Submarine phase ............................................... 62 Withdrawal of the striking force ................................. 63 Damage to United States naval forces and installations as a result of the attack .................................................. 64 Damage to United States Army forces and installations as a result of the attack .................................................. 65 Japanese losses .................................................. 65 Summary comparison of losses ..................................... 65 State of readiness to meet the attack ............................ 66 Attack a surprise .............................................. 66 Personnel ...................................................... 66 Antiaircraft ................................................... 67 Aircraft ....................................................... 68 Action taken following the attack ................................ 68 Defensive forces and facilities of the Navy at Hawaii ............ 69 Defensive forces and facilities of the Army at Hawaii ............ 70 Comparison of strength and losses: Japanese attacking force and Hawaiian defensive forces ...................................... 70 Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii ............................... 75 Consciousness of danger from air attack .......................... 75 Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack ........... 75 General Short's awareness of danger from air attack ............ 79 Plans for the defense of Hawaiian coastal frontier ............. 81 Concept of the war in the Pacific .............................. 87 Conclusions with respect to consciousness of danger from air attack ....................................................... 88 Information supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington indicating the imminence of war .............................................. 89 Information supplied General Short by Washington indicating the imminence of war .............................................. 100 Action taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to warnings and orders from Washington ............................................... 103 Dispatch of October 16 from-Chief of Naval Operations ....... 103 Dispatch of November 24 from Chief of Naval Operations ...... 104 The "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ................... 104 Evaluation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ......... 107 On where the attack might come .............................. 107 Other dispatches received on November 27 .................... 108 "Psychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral Kimmel ....... 109 The "War warning" and training .............................. 110 The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to institute distant reconnaissance .................................... 110 Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning" .... 117 Estimate and action taken by General Short with respect to the warning dispatch of November 27 ............................... 119 No warning of attack on Hawaii .............................. 120 Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage .................... 121 "Do-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and "Avoidance of war" ........................................ 123 Commanding general's reliance on the Navy .................... 125 Interference with training ................................... 125 The order to undertake reconnaissance ........................... 126 The Short reply ................................................. 128 Action which was not taken upon receipt of the November 27 dispatch ...................................................... 129 The "Code destruction" intelligence ............................. 130 General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter by Japanese consulate ......................................... 131 The "Lost" Japanese carriers Radio intelligence at Hawaii ....... 133 The "Mori" call ................................................. 137 Detection of Japanese submarine on morning of December 7 ........ 138 Radar detection of Japanese raiding force ....................... 140 Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in Hawaii .......... 142 Channels of intelligence ..................................... 142 The "Manila message" ......................................... 142 The Honolulu press ........................................... 142 The role of espionage in the attack ............................. 145 Liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short ................ 150 Estimate of the situation ....................................... 153 Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington ........................... 159 Basing the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii .............................. 159 Defensive facilities available in Hawaii ........................ 163 Transfer of Pacific Fleet units to the Atlantic ................. 167 "ABCD" understanding? ........................................... 168 Avoidance of war ................................................ 172 Intelligence available in Washington ............................ 179 The "Magic" .................................................. 179 Policy with respect to dissemination of magic ................ 180 "Ships in harbor" reports ....................................... 181 Nature of consular espionage ................................. 181 Conclusions with respect to "Ships in harbor" reports ........ 189 The "Winds code" ................................................ 191 "Hidden word" code .............................................. 192 The "Deadline messages" ......................................... 193 Dispatches indicating fraudulent nature of negotiations after November 28, 1941 ............................................. 195 Status of diplomatic negotiations and the Army dispatch of November 27 ................................................... 198 Failure to follow-up on the Short reply of November 28 .......... 201 The "Berlin message" ............................................ 204 Code destruction intelligence ................................... 205 The McCollum dispatch ........................................... 206 Events of December 6 and 7, 1941 ................................ 209 The "Pilot message" ........................................... 210 The fourteen part memorandum .................................. 211 First thirteen parts ........................................ 211 Analysis and significance of first thirteen parts proper .... 212 Military significance of "Pilot" and "13-part" messages apart from messages proper ................................ 219 The fourteenth part ....................................... 221 "One o'clock" and final code destruction messages ............... 222 Events attending transmittal of the December 7 dispatch ...... 224 Choice of facilities ......................................... 225 Significance of the "One o'clock" and code destruction messages ................................................... 226 Significant messages translated after the attack ................ 228 Intelligence concerning Hawaiian defenses ..................... 228 Considerations responsible for delays in translations ......... 230 Conclusions with respect to intelligence available in Washington which was not supplied Hawaii ...................... 232 Estimate of the situation in Washington ......................... 234 Nature of responsibilities ...................................... 237 Duties in Hawaii ............................................. 237 Duties in Washington ......................................... 238 Unity of command ................................................ 240 General observations ............................................ 245 The "Wyman Matter" ........................................... 245 The Philippine Attack ........................................ 246 Prior inquiries concerning the Pearl Harbor attack ........... 246 Part V. Conclusions and recommendations ........................... 251 Conclusions with respect to responsibilities .................... 251 Recommendations ................................................. 252 Supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in our military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl Harbor investigation .......................................... 253 Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility ...... 254 Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the alerting of subordinates ................... 254 Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information ............................................... 255 The delegation of authority or the issuance of order's entails the duty of inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly exercised .................... 255 The implementation of official orders must be followed with closest supervision ....................................... 256 The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured through repetition ................................ 256 Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and decisive action are of the essence ............. 257 The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials ................................................. 257 The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is fatal: There should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on matters that are in doubt ................................. 258 There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials ..... 259 Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and appropriateness ....................... 259 There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information received and every effort should be made to insure that the paraphrased material reflects the true meaning of the original .................................................. 260 Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of unusual situations .......................... 261 Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the organization .............................................. 261 There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident .. 262 Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of significant information ................................ 262 An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his organization should forfeit his responsibility ... 263 Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality ....................................... 263 Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official instruction ...................................... 263 Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization ... 264 Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the latter is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more agencies .................................................. 264 No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure to perform a fundamental task ............................. 265 Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors informed ............................. 285 The administrative organization of any establishment must be designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility .. 265 In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority .............................. 266 Committee members signing the report ............................ 266 Additional views of Mr. Keefe ................................... 266 Appendix A. Prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor attack .......................................................... 269 The Roberts Commission .......................................... 269 The Hart Inquiry ................................................ 269 The Army Pearl Harbor Board ..................................... 269 The Navy Court of Inquiry ....................................... 270 The Clarke Inquiry .............................................. 270 The Clausen Investigation ....................................... 270 The Hewitt Inquiry .............................................. 271 Appendix B. Names and positions of principal Army and Navy officials in Washington and at Hawaii at the time of the attack along with the leading witnesses in the various proceedings ..... 275 Organization and personnel of War Department .................. 275 Army Air Forces ............................................. 275 Organization and personnel of Navy Department ................. 276 Organization and personnel of Hawaiian Department ............. 276 Hawaiian Air Force .......................................... 277 Staff of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and United States Pacific Fleet ........................................ 277 Organization and personnel of Fourteenth Naval District .... 278 List of witnesses appearing before the Joint Committee and their assignments as of December 7, 1941 .................... 278 List of leading witnesses in prior proceedings who did not testify before the Joint Committee and their assignments as of December 7, 1941 ......................................... 279 Appendix C. Communications from the President of the United States relating to the Pearl Harbor investigation ...................... 285 Appendix D. Review of the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic Conference in August 1941 through December 8, 1941 .............. 291 Introductory statement ........................................ 291 Brief resume of the Japanese-American conversations prior to the Atlantic Conference ..................................... 293 The Atlantic Conference (August 10-14, 1941) .................. 300 President Roosevelt warns Japan against further aggression and at the same time offers to resume the Japanese-American conversations (August 17, 1941) ............................. 302 Japan protests United States shipments of oil to Russia (August 27, 1941) ........................................... 305 Premier Konoye sends a personal message to President Roosevelt urging the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August 28, 1941) .... 306 Germany suspects treachery (August 29-30, 1941) ................. 307 President Roosevelt replies to Premier Konoye's message (September 3, 1941) ........................................... 310 Japan presents new proposals in a new form (September 6, 1941) .. 311 Ambassador Grew supports the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August-September, 1941) ....................................... 314 Japan determines its minimum demands and its maximum concessions in the negotiations with the United States (September 6, 1941) ........................................... 316 The United States asks Japan to clarify its new proposals (October 2, 1941) ............................................. 319 Germany demands that Japan warn the United States that war between Germany and Italy and the United States would lead to war between Japan and the United States pursuant to the Tripartite Pact (October 1941) ................................ 325 The Konoye Cabinet falls, and Ambassador Nomura asks permission to return to Japan (October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5, 1941) ......................................................... 326 The Tojo Cabinet formulates its "Absolutely final proposal" (November 5, 1941) ............................................ 331 Ambassador Grew warns that war with Japan may come with "Dramatic and dangerous suddenness" (November 3, 1941) ........ 335 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appeals to Great Britain and the United States for aid (October 28-November 4, 1941) ........... 337 Japan delivers its next-to-last proposal to the United States (November 10, 1941) ........................................... 344 The Tojo Cabinet refuses to consider any suggestion less favorable to Japan than its" Absolutely final proposal" (November 18-19, 1941) ........................................ 355 Japan delivers its "Absolutely final proposal" to the United States and demands an agreement on that basis (November 20, 1941) ........................................... 360 The United States replies (November 26, 1941) ................... 363 The Tojo Cabinet makes a pretense of continuing the Japanese- American conversations and at the same time moves additional Japanese troops into southern Indochina (November 27-December 7, 1941) ................................ 387 The invasion of Thailand by Japanese forces from French Indochina appears imminent (December 1-7, 1941) ......................... 405 Germany tells Japan the time is ripe to strike at the United States, and promises to join with Japan in war against the United States (November 29, 1941) ............................. 409 President Roosevelt returns to Washington as the far eastern situation moves rapidly toward a climax (December 1, 1941) .... 411 President Roosevelt asks the Japanese Government to explain its purpose in moving additional troops into southern Indochina (December 2, 1941) ............................................. 415 The Japanese Government claims its troop movements in French Indochina are for the purpose of defense against an attack by the Chinese (December 5, 1941) ................................ 421 The last hours (December 6-8, 1941) ............................. 424 Appendix E. The "Winds Code" ...................................... 469 Establishment and nature of the "Winds Code" .................... 469 Efforts to monitor .............................................. 471 Considerations bearing on the possibility of a message in execution of the "Winds Code" having been received prior to December 7, 1941 .............................................. 471 Considerations militating against likelihood of "Winds Code" execute message having been received prior to December 7, 1941 .............................................. 475 Appendix F. Geographical considerations and Navy and Army installations ................................................... 489 Geographical considerations ................................... 489 Navy and Army installations ................................... 490 Navy ........................................................ 490 Army ........................................................ 491 Illustrations ................................................. 499


see also:

Pearl Harbor Final Judgement by H.C.Clausen & Bruce Lee

The New Mysteries of Pearl Harbor by Francois Delpla

Return to Delpla main page

Audio-video documents
France in WWII
Vichy law and the Holocaust
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